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Five years ago the Atlantic Alliance initiated a comprehensive review 
of its 10ng term defense needs. The result was consensus Oli two key 
points: 
- The Warsaw Pact had not matched Westem restraint on arma-
ments in the early 1970s but had continued a massive military 
buildup despite its pronouncements of genuine interest in peace; 
- To maintain deterrence the Alliance would have to respond with 
a comprehensive and sustained program for improving its military 
posture. 
Thus, the commitment to real increases by allies in defense spending 
of 3 % annually and to the Long Term. Defense Program (L TDP) became 
centerpieces of NATO's security polícy for ensuring the viability of de-
terrence in the 1980s. 
In late 1980 I presented in public fora an assessment of the evolving 
balance and the growmg challenges to Allíance security within and beyond 
the NATO area. In brief, my assessment then was that the threat to the 
A1liance has grown rapidly over the past 20 years and continues to grow; 
that despite the efforts the Alliance has made, our relative military capa-
bility to counter the threat is declíning; and, therefore, the credibility of 
our deterrent is diminishing and is in jeopardy. The negative tone of the 
assessment resulted from nations' failing to fulfill sufficient1y their com-
mitments to Force Goals and the LTDP. 
(*) Este artigo do general Bemard W. Rogers, Comandante Supremo das Forças Aliadas 
na Europa (SACEUR) foi escrito para ser publicado em todos os países da Aliança Atlântica 
por revistas da especialidade. 
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What occurred during 1981 which impacted upon the balance? First, 
the Warsaw Pacto At the theater nuclear leveI: 
14 
- New «SS-20» sites became operational at a rate which equated to 
more than 5 new launchers per month in 1981; these new sites 
added over 200 warheads on launchers (over 400 counting refires); 
- We continued to observe deployment or preparations for deployment 
of the new generation of Soviet medium range missiles - the «SS-21», 
the «SS-22» and the «SS-X-23» - alIof which have improved accuracy 
and destructive power over the older systems they replace or sup-
plement. 
With regard to Warsaw Pact ground forces, during 1981: 
- Our assessmen~ of the ground forces facing Allied Command Europe 
(ACE) increased by 6 divisions; 
- Divisional reorganization in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany 
was nearing completion, which, inter alia, adds an artillery bat-
talion to all their tank regiments and upgrades the regimental moto-
rized rifle companies in their tank divisions to battalions; 
- Approximately 2000 «T -64/72» tanks were added to the inventory, 
with the «T -80» entering trial production. 
In the air we saw in 1981: 
- The addition of about 1000 modem aircraft to the Warsaw Pact 
inventory; 
- Development of the modified FOXBAT, the USSR's first Iook-
-down/shoot-down fighter; and 
- Continued ·ttials of the new Sukhoi close air support fighter. 
As for nav~ forces, I would note that in 1981 the Warsaw Pact: 
- Increased its capabilities for long range operations and power pro-
jection by adding the KIROV SAMjSSM cruiser and SOVRE-
MENNY Class destroyer to the inventory; 
- Launched an Jldditonal 8 submarines (5 nuclear powered); 
- Added 30 surface ships of alI types to its operational fleet. 
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Across the board, theWarsaw Pact also continued to improve its sig-
nificant capability to suport and sustain its forces. 
In sum, in 1981 we saw a continued increase in Soviet offensive capa-
bilities, reflecting a determination to shift the balance further to NATO's 
disadvantage. 
On the ACE side of the ledger, with respect to Tactica1 Nuclear For-
ces (TNF): 
- The Alliance remained firm in its support of the December 1979 
two-track decisi~n, full implementation of which remains SACEUR's 
highest priority; 
- The (<zero levei outcome» was defined and adopted; 
- The deployment schedule of GLCMs and PlIs remained on track; 
- Negotiations on TNF arms control and reduction measures got 
underway. 
During 1981 we enhanced ACE conventional readiness in a broad 
range of national and multinational efforts. For example: 
- We fielded a significant number of new anti-armor systems and 
several hundred improved artillery pieces, modem tanks and mod-
ern tactical aircraft; 
- Although our modemization programs for maritime forces still lag 
behind the growing needs for them, the United States announced 
a major fleet expansion which will help secure control of the seas 
in the Iong term; 
- Some slight improvement was made in our very inadequate abllity 
to sustain our forces with fueI, ammunition and reserve materiel 
stocks; 
- The A W ACS progmm became fully supported and on schedule; 
- The U. S. made decisions directed toward future major enchance-
ments of its forces. 
We further improved readiness in 1981 through significant advances 
in ACE reinforcement planning. National responses to the SHAPE Rapid 
Reinforcement PIan were generally favorable; we havecompIeted the plan 
and forwarded it for approvaI by NATO's Political authorities. We wel-
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come Germany's agreement to provide over 90,000 personnel for Wartime 
Host Nation Support, thus materially assisting the introduction of externaI 
combat formations into our Central Region. 
Of particular importance to the Northern Region was the reaffir-
mation by Norway of the decision to pre-stock equipment for a US Marine 
Amphibious Brigade and to position in the N orth the equipment for a 
second Norwegian Regimental Combat Team. We are very pleased by 
Canada's announcement in December 1981 that it is funding the pres-
tocking in N orway of equipment for its air and sea transportable briga de 
group. 
The reintegration of Greek forces in the military structure holds the 
promise of considerably strengthening NATO's vital Southern Region. 
The willingness of the nations of the region to do more, and the military 
and economic assistance others provide to Turkey, Greece and Portugal 
are of continuing significance. Spain's prospective membership provides 
the potential to enhance materially the security posture of this key area. 
These improvements to our security arrangements are most welcome. 
Some nations, however, decided in 1981 to reduce defense spending, which, 
in some instances, will result in a downward spiralling of their conven-
tional capabilities. Nevertheless, if one gauges our military force structure 
in ACE today against that of a few years ago and takes into account 
the fiscal strains besetting our national economies, then our collective 
performance in the defense sector, despite its deficiencies, can be viewed 
in a positive light. 
Unfortunately, measuring our efforts against national economic con-
straints does not give us a valid yardstick by which to assess our ability 
to deter and defendo It is in the more relevant context of comparative 
m·ilitary capabilities actually available to NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
that our security must be judged. 
In that context, the candid assessment which I presented in 1980 is 
still applicable today. Although ACE is stronger today than in 1980, the 
gap between NATO and Warsaw Pact relative force capabilities continues 
to widen. There is good cause for concern about the impact of this con-
tinually wi~ening gap in real military capabilities on OUf ability to im-
plement NATO strategy. 
In the days of the West's nuclear superiority, a «trip wrre}> strategy 
of «massive retaliation» that posited the early use of strategic nuclear 
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weapons made sense. But a decade and a half ago, as the Soviets strove 
for strategic nuclear parity, NATO recognized the bankruptcy of that 
strategy and developed our current deterrent strategy of Flexible Response. 
This strategy is deliberately vague about the precise nature of our re-
sponse to aggression; however, it envisions 3 types of military response: 
- Direct defense to defeat an attack or place the burden of escalatión 
on the enemy; 
- Deliberate escalatíon on our part; 
- General nuclear response, the ultima te guarantor of deterrence. 
This strategy remains applicable today for meeting our security chal-
lenges if adequate and appropriate forces to fulfill it are available. But 
what is to be said of a strategy of deterrence, which, after several years 
of insufficient effort relative to the threats which must be deterred, ap-
proaches a point of being inoperable? Are we at or near such a point? Do we 
have in reality a strategy which requires capabilities so obviously greater 
than those which exist that the deterrent impact is lost upon the minds 
of the leaders of the USSR? These are unpleasant questions, but they 
are relevant in the context of the current Soviet quest for military super-
iority. To answer them we must take a hard look at the manner by 
which we are to implement Flexible Response. 
If Flexible Response is to be credible, it must be supported by an 
adequate military capability for each leg of our Triad. At the strategic 
nuclear leveI, the Soviets have made vast improvements over the last dec-
ade; fortunately, the United States and the United Kingdom are plan-
ning to ensure the continued deterrent value of our strategic forces. At the 
theater nuclear leveI we must ensure that we implement the December 
1979 two-track program if we are to succeed in eliminating the imbalance. 
Thus, while we have no reason for complacency regarding the nuclear 
components of the Triad, we have recognized the need to improve them 
and have begun to act. Remaining is the third element of the Triad: 
conventional forces. It is with regard to their role in the strategy of 
Flexible Response, and our ability to fulfill that role, that I bave the 
greatest concems. 
The awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the grave risk 
of rapid escalation to a general nuclear exchange which could resuIt from 
the first use of theater nuclear weapons are persuasive· arguments for 
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keeping the nuclear threshold in Europe as high as possible. That can 
only be done by maintaining adequate conventional forces. In my judge-
ment, by continuing to fail to provid sufficient1y for these forces, we 
are committing the double error of reducing our ability to deter while 
lowering the nuclear threshold should deterrence fail. 
Although our strategy calls for us to resort initially to conventional 
defense without escalation, its clear implication is that to deter conven-
tional attack we must convince the Soviets of our readineJSs, if forced, to 
escalate to nuclear war. In 1967, when NATO possessed significant the-
ater nuclear advantages, such reliance on esca1atory potential was undoubt-
edlycredible in Soviet eyes. But is it now, in a time when the Soviets 
equal or have surpassed the West in the measures of strategic nuclear 
strength and enjoy an unprecedented theater nuclear superiority? Might 
they believe that under such conditions we would not esca1ate to TNF? 
The question is not one of our natioD.s' confidence in each other or 
of ourcollective will, but rather one of the beliefs about us held by 
leaders on the other side. My concem is that in the context of inter-
national crisis, the Soviets would perceive that they possess both the capa-
bility to inflict a conventional defeat and a sufficient nuclear edge to 
deter NATO's escalation. Such a perception could well cause the Soviet 
leaders to justify the risks of direct attack, or of aggression against vital 
Allied interests outside the NATO area, or of political coercion of NATO 
nations. 
Alliance defense policy has for some years implicit1y recognized the 
impacton escalatory credibility of these trends in the nuclear balance. 
As a consequence, we dedicated ourselves to improving the deterrent 
contribution of both our theater nuclear and conventional forces. However, 
our commitment to conventional force modernization, implicit in adopting 
our strategy in 1967, reaffirmed by the L IDP in 1978 and biennially by 
the agreed Force Goals, has not been fulfilled and cannot be realized at 
current leveIs of effort. Consequent1y, what remains is a conventional pos-
ture which is clearly inadequate to accommodate the growing conventio-
na! threat and which leaves us terribly uncomfortable that it is we who 
will be forced to bear the burden of escalation to nuclear weapons in 
the event of major conventional aggression against uso 
18 
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE: KEEPING THE PEACE WITH FREEDOM 
In my view, the viability of the Alliance strategy has arrived at a 
criticaI crossroads. On the one hand, with our current leveI of effort (and 
our inability to sustain our forces with manpower, ammunition and war 
reserve stocks in a conventional war), we can continue to maintain our 
present posture that in reality equates to a «delayed tripwire.» This is a 
posture which, against Iarge scaIe conventional aggression, might at best 
- given adequate warning and timeIy and appropriate polítiCaI decisions-
be sufficient to allow us only the time and security necessary to deliberate 
and execute the employment of nuclear options - or, failing that, to ca-
pitulate. On the other hand, there is an alternative available to us which 
would seek a conventional capability that would give us a reasonable 
prospect of success in the forward defense, with success defined as the 
capability to check a major conventional aggression and place the burden 
of escalation - or withdrawal- on the agressor. 
For our planning to proceed in a coherent manner, I believe we need 
to determine which role we wish the conventional leg of the Triad to 
pIay. My own judgment is that there is a compelling case for adopting 
the alternative. In providing ourselves such a conventional capability, we 
would shift the decision of escalation to the potencial aggressor who is 
no more anxious to escala te than are we in view of the uncertainty whe-
ther the first use of nuclear weapons will soon further escaIate to the 
strategic nuclear leveI. 
Moreover, to the extent that we are successful in the arms reduction 
negotiations in eliminating LRTNF and placing limitations on MRTNF 
systems, we must have a correspondingly strengthened conventional pos-
ture - or a sudden breakthrough at the MBFR talks - if we are to pre-
serve our deterrence. Otherwise our deterrent spectrum would then consist 
of conventional forces on one end and strategic nuclear systems on the 
other, with our only escalatory option coupling the extremes being rela-
tively short-range nuclear weapons, most of which would Iand on our 
own soil. The «zero leveI outcome» proposaI is a move for peace that 
reflects our peoples' antipathy towards the risk of nuclear war; however, 
if achieved we would need to have increased confidence in the strength 
of our conventional capability. 
Let me sketch out the basic requirements for the kind of viable 
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conventional deterrent I think we . need. They fall in three areas: rea-
diness, sustainability and survivability. In brief outline, we must have 
adequate, ready, in-place, triservice forces which are capable, with mini-
mum warning, of preventing foward based Warsaw Pact forces from gai-
ning air superiority, seizing exits to the Atlantic or Mediterranean, achiev-
ing early penetration of forward defensive positions or destroying vital 
rear area logistical installations. We must also be able to generate ad-
equately trained and equipped European reserves and the initial increment 
of North American air and ground reinforcements. To ensure \hat we 
can maintain ground force ratios which permit a coherent defense, there 
is an urgent need to be able to target and destroy by conventional means 
the Warsaw Pact second echelon forces - its follow-on divisions - before 
they engage at the main: battle area. 
We must be able to sustain our forces with adequa te personnel replace-
ments, reserve materiel stocks, fuel and ammunition. In all this, defense 
of lines of communications,· strategic lift, infrastructure and host nation 
support play key roles. 
If our conventional forces are to surviv~ on the modem ba~tlefield, 
we must redress our mid-term vulnerability to air attack, ensure that our 
forces can survive and operate in a toxic environment, and improve sig-
nificantly our electronic . warfare capability. We are making very limite~ 
progress in the electronic warfare area, one in which our technological 
superiority could be applied to such great advantage to blind enemy elec-
tlOniC systems and to cut communications between the highly centralized 
direction of operations and the operational units. 
We must also have an additional capability - the capacity to shift 
rapidly to the counterattack, the very essence of a viable defense. Defend-
tng Westem Europe consists of more than merely ·occupying a series of 
delaying positions until we are at the English Channel; it means being 
able to conduct local counterattacks to check the aggressor, regain lost 
territory, and tum his forces eastward, carrying with it the increased 
Soviet concem about maintaining Warsaw Pact unity under those con-
ditions. 
The concept I have outlined may appear ambitious. Yet most of the 
additional capabilities called for can be accomplished within the consfraint 
of a reasonable economic challenge to each nation and at leveIs of national 
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. defense expenditure which are not so great as most persons imagine. 
In fact, most of what is needed for the conventional deterrent I have 
described is in the Force Proposals for 1983 to 1988, which we would 
hope that ministers will adopt as Force Goals - and national commit-
ments - at their meeting in May 1982. Nations' meeting these Forge Pro-
posaIs on the schedule set forth will provide us an adequate conventional 
capability by the end of this decade. 
In summary, our ability to impIement effectively our strategy of Flex-
ible Response continues to decline and the credibility of our deterrent 
is jeopardized. At the strategic and theater nuclear leveIs, decisions have 
been made which, if carried out, will help arrest this decline. Either 
through new weapons deployments or arms reduction agreements - or a 
combination of the two - we are committed to redressing the nuclear 
balance. But at the conventional leveI, there exists no parallel sense of 
urgency or decisive action. ACE needs the conventional improvements 
outlined in our Force Proposals if we are to have ready, sustainable and 
survivable forces. Without them, and with continued Warsaw Pact mili-
tary growth, we must a11 understand what the strategy is that can be im-
plemented. Today - and for the forseeable future at current leveIs of effort 
and status of our forces - it is one which, if we are attacked, wiIl soon 
face us with 2 choices: escalation with whatever theater nuclear forces 
we possess, or capitulation. Further, any success we achieve through our 
negotiations in reducing the role of nuclear weapons must inevitably place 
greater weight on the conventional Ieg of the Triad. 
The picture I have painted is accurate and somber, but it is also one 
overladen with shades of hope and confidence based upon our potentiaI 
national and coIlective resolve - and ability - to regain the momentum 
we established with our previous commitment to continuous real growth 
in our defense spending. It is a regrettable but inescapable fact that we 
face a potential enemy deterrnined to pursue the creation of massive mili-
tary power in order to be dominant. Because of that fact, as a defensive 
Alliance - although we need not match the Warsaw Pact one for on'" 
in areas of statistical measurement - we are compelled to set our leveIs 
of defense spending higher than we would like; we are not afforded the 
luxury of setting them as we wish irrespective of the growing menace to 
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our freedom. However, until we can achieve real, verifiable and balanced 
arms reductions in ali force areas, the strategic realities of our time 
- and for the future we would wish to have - require conventional for-
ces truly capable of sustained defense. Fulfilling that need will enable us 
to complete NATO's fourth decade in peace with our freedom intact 
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